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PRECEDENT, THE AMENDMENT PROCESS,
AND EVOLUTION IN CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE
GEOFFREY

R.

STONE*

Recently, a formal policy report within the Department of
Justice recommended that the Department should urge the
Supreme Court of the United States to overrule its landmark
1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona.' The general tenor of the
report called to mind Gulliver's analysis of the doctrine of precedent. "It is a maxim among [our] lawyers," said Gulliver,
"that whatever has been done before may be legally done
again, and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions formerly made against common justice and the general
reason of mankind. These, under the name of precedent, they
produce as authorities to justify the most iniquitous2 opinions,
and the judges never fail of directing accordingly."
In what circumstances, if any, is it appropriate for a Justice of
the Supreme Court to vote to overrule a major constitutional
decision? This is a timely and, indeed, always important question. It is also a question whose answer does not necessarily
correspond to any particular political ideology. In some circumstances, liberals may see themselves as benefiting from a
more aggressive tendency to overrule. In other circumstances,
conservatives may see themselves as the beneficiaries. I would
like to examine this question without regard to whether the
precedent at issue is Miranda or Bowers v. Hardwick.'

There are two extreme positions. First, the Supreme Court
should never overrule a prior decision. To support this view,
one might argue that prior Justices should be treated in much
the same way as the Framers themselves. The Justices of the
Supreme Court may and indeed must interpret the prior judgments of the Framers, as expressed in the constitutional text,
but they may not explicitly "overrule" those judgments. If the
* Harry Kalven Jr. Professor of Law and Dean, University of Chicago Law School.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF
LEGAL POLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAw OF PRE-TRIAL INTERROGATION (1987).

2. J. SwirT, GULLIVER'S TRAVELS 275 (Novel Library ed. 1947).
3. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy).
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judgments of the Framers are to be explicitly overruled, it must
be through the process of constitutional amendment.
One might argue that the decisions of prior Justices should
be analogized to thejudgments of the framers. SubsequentJustices may and must interpret such decisions, but they may not
explicitly overrule them. If such decisions are wrong, outdated,
or bad policy, they too should be dealt with through the
processes of constitutional amendment.
At the time the Constitution was adopted, there was considerable disagreement over the amendment process. Thomas Jefferson believed that the Constitution should be rewritten every
generation, on the theory that without frequent constitutionmaking there would be too little participation in the affairs of
government. As Jefferson put it, "Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them .. . too
sacred to be touched. They ascribe to the men of the preceding
age a wisdom more than human .... Let us not weakly believe
that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care
of itself . . ."' James Madison rejected this view. He believed
that Jefferson's vision would produce instability and generate
"violent struggle." 5
HadJefferson's view prevailed, a policy of unalterable precedent would have been quite plausible, for the interpretive decisions of the Justices would then routinely be open to reversal
through the processes of amendment. In fact, however, the
Madisonian view has prevailed. The processes of constitutional
amendment are quite cumbersome. As a consequence, in the
200-year history of the Constitution, only four times has the
nation adopted a constitutional amendment to overrule a
Supreme Court decision: the Eleventh Amendment overruled
Chisholm v. Georgia6 ; the Fourteenth Amendment, Dred Scott v.
Sandford'; the Sixteenth Amendment, Pollack v. Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co.8; and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, Oregon v.
Mitchell.9
4. Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, reprintedin THE PORTABLE THOMASJEFFERSON 558-59 (1975).
5. Letter to Thomas Jefferson, Feb. 4, 1790, reprintedin THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER
232 (M. Meyers ed. 1969).

6.
7.
8.
9.

2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
60 U.S. (18 How.) 393 (1857).
157 U.S. 429 (1895).
400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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In such circumstances, the position that prior judicial decisions may not be overruled would produce a highly rigidified
and inflexible jurisprudence. There would be little or no opportunity to correct mistakes or to reexamine prior decisions in
light of the changing circumstances of an evolving society.
Now, it is important to note that these same concerns also
arise with respect to the judgments of the Framers. Because we
amend the Constitution so rarely, the judgments of the Framers entrap and rigidify our constitutional jurisprudence. As Jefferson warned, we may have come to see our Constitution as
"too sacred to be touched. ' ' "O
There are at least two factors, however, that may make this
state of affairs acceptable with respect to the judgments of the
Framers, even though it would not be acceptable with respect
to the decisions of prior justices. First, the judgments of the
Framers are for the most part expressed in grand generalities.
They bind, but only in the most general sense. We can and
have developed a lively and dynamic constitutional jurisprudence within the very broad confines of the Framers's design. A
system of unalterable judicial precedent, on the other hand,
with an ever-growing body of decisions, would gradually choke
off all opportunity for growth and reexamination.
Second, the Framers's judgments were embodied in the text
of the Constitution through the processes of constitution-making. The Justices of the Supreme Court may and must interpret
those judgments, but no theory of constitutional interpretation
suggests that the Justices are empowered explicitly to overrule
those judgments. Prior Justices, on the other hand, have no
greater constitutional authority than subsequent Justices. Their
power to interpret the Constitution is not superior to the
power of their successors under any interpretive theory. Thus,
if subsequent Justices overrule the judgments of their predecessors, they are not rejecting judgments that have any greater
constitutional status than their own.
This, then, brings me to the second extreme position- every
issue of constitutional law is a question of first impression.
Under this view, prior decisions have persuasive authority only.
This poses the question: Why adopt a policy of precedent at
all? Why should subsequent Justices ever have to follow a deci10. See supra note 4.
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sion they believe to be wrong? Since their authority to interpret
the Constitution is equal to that of their predecessors, why
should they not be free to make their own, independent judgments as to the most appropriate interpretation of the constitutional text?
Several justifications are commonly offered for the doctrine
of precedent. First, we do not have unlimited judicial resources. If every issue in every case is a question of first impression, our judicial system would simply be overwhelmed with
endless litigation. Second, we need a degree of predictability in
our affairs. Interests of fairness, efficiency, and the enhancement of social interaction require that governments and citizens have a reasonably settled sense of what they may and may
not do. Third, the doctrine of precedent raises the stakes. The
Justice who knows that each decision governs not only the litigants to the particular case, but the rights of millions of individuals in the present and future, will approach the issue with
less concern with the merits of the litigants as individuals and
more concern with the merits of the underlying legal question
to be decided. Fourth, the doctrine of precedent reflects a generally cautious approach to the resolution of legal issues. It reflects the view that change poses unknown risks, and that we
generally should prefer the risks we know to those we cannot
foresee. It thus values Madisonian stability over Jeffersonian
change. Fifth, the doctrine of precedent reduces the potential
politicization of the Court. It moderates ideological swings and
thus preserves both the appearance and the reality of the Court
as a legal rather than a purely political institution. And finally,
from the perspective of the Justices themselves, the doctrine of
precedent enhances the potential of the Justices to make lasting
contributions. If a Justice disregards the judgments of those
who preceded him, he invites the very same treatment from
those who succeed him. A Justice who wants to preserve the
value of his own coin must not devalue the coin of his
predecessors.
Now, if we reject the two extreme positions-precedent always controls, and precedent never controls-we are left with
the hard question. When may a Justice appropriately overrule
an important constitutional decision? What is needed is some
accommodation between the values of stability and the necessity for change.
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Perhaps the best way to approach the question is by reference to the reasons for overruling a case. Three reasons are
worth considering. First, in some instances, a Justice may conclude that a prior decision was based on certain factual premises that have been proven incorrect and that the Justices who
reached the prior decision would themselves have reached a
different result, had they known then what the Court knows
now. This would be the case, for example, if the prior decision
was based on erroneous assumptions either about the state of
the world or about the likely consequences of the decision.
Honestly applied, this is the least problematic reason for
overruling.
Second, in some instances, a Justice may conclude that a
prior decision was premised on a state of affairs that has
changed so much over time that the Justices who reached the
prior decision would themselves have reached a different result
in light of the changed circumstances. This might be the case,
for example, when there are significant technological, economic, social, political, institutional, or jurisprudential
changes. With such factual changes, our understanding of the
meaning of particular constitutional provisions may evolve as
well. On this view, a decision that was "right" in one set of
circumstances may appropriately be overruled because it is
"wrong" in a new and different era. This is a more controversial basis for overruling than the first, for there are those who
eschew the idea of an evolving constitutional jurisprudence and
who reject the relevance of changed circumstances. Nonetheless, this basis for overruling, honestly applied, seems to me
perfectly reasonable.
Finally, a Justice may conclude that a prior decision was simply "wrong" at the time it was decided. Had he been a Justice
at the time of the prior decision, he would have voted the opposite way. Now that he has found four other Justices who
share his view, he will overrule the "wrong" decision. This is
the most problematic basis for overruling. Without the justification of either inaccurate factual premises or changed circumstances, the Justice in this situation is merely substituting his
judgment for that of his predecessors. And although his predecessors may have no claim to greater interpretive authority
than their successors, it is likewise true that the successors have
no greater interpretive authority than their predecessors. Why,
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then, should the view of the successors prevail? Such a basis for
overruling substitutes power for principle and generates instability, unpredictability, politicization, and all the other dangers
sought to be avoided by the doctrine of precedent.
Having said this, I must concede that it has long been recognized, as Justice Frankfurter put it, that "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself, not what
[the Justices have] said about it."" Accordingly, the Justices
have consistently maintained that the doctrine of precedent has
less force in the realm of constitutional interpretation than in
other areas of the law.
It is important, however, to understand the rationale behind
this approach. The rationale has been well stated by Edward
Levi:
A change of mind from time to time is inevitable when there
is a written constitution ... [for] there can be no authoritative interpretation of the Constitution.... The Constitution
in its general provisions embodies the conflicting ideals of
the community. Who is to say what these ideals mean in any
definite way? Certainly not the framers, for they did their
work when the words were put down. The words are
ambiguous. 2
This ambiguity is no accident. Situations change and people's
desires change. There must be room for the infusion of new
ideas. In this manner, constitutional interpretation is able to
"express the ideas of the community."'"
Thus, the third basis for overruling-that the Justices are
free to "go back to the Constitution itself"-is at its core
merely a restatement of the second. Except in the most extraordinary of circumstances, a prior interpretation can be said
to be "wrong" not in any definitive sense, but only in the sense
that the process of constitutional interpretation is a process of
evolution. It is a dynamic process through which constitutional
law comes, as in Mr. Levi's words, "to express the ideas of the
community."" Those who reject this vision of the Constitution
and who insist on a definitive and static view of constitutional
"right" and "wrong," ultimately must rely on power, rather
than on principle, to effect their constitutional change.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939).
E. LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 58 (1949).
Id. at4.
Id.
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The real truth is that within the bounds of reason-and I believe that there are bounds of reason-Miranda v. Arizona is no
more definitely wrong than Bowers v. Hardwick is definitely right.
These decisions are based on widely divergent theories of constitutional interpretation, but these theories are each held by
persons possessing intellect, thoughtfulness, a commitment to
the Constitution, and good will. We must never stop debating
these questions, but we must also not lose our humility in the
process. If we stop, and if we insist definitely on the ultimate
"rightness" of our views, then we surely pose the greatest
threat to our constitutional order.
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